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Increasing Citizen Participation in
Administrative Proceedings: Can
Federal Financing Bridge the

Costs Barrier?
Coeta Chambers*
Due to thepervasive effects ofadministrativeactivities on American society, there
have been efforts to increase public particoation in agency proceedings in order to
counter the institutional bias which hadformerly favored regulated interests in the
decisionmaking process. Along with these efforts came the realization that many
public representatives were precludedfrom participating because of the prohibitive
cost of effective particpation. Professor Chambers examines two programs which
attempt to pro videfederalfunding for such participation--an establishedprogram
within the Federal Trade Commission and aproposedprogrampresentedin a recent
Senate bill She concludes that the approach of the Federal Trade Commission,
expanded to all agencies in a program similar to that in the Senate bill and supplemented with express directions in areas which were either ambiguous or omitted
under previousprograms would assure adequate public participation, reduce agency
bias, andproduce better agency decisions in the public interest.
INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEMS facing this nation have become more
A Scomplex,
Congress has increasingly turned to administrative
agencies for solutions. The original wisdom was that the best solutions are devised by experts guided only by their specialized,
technical skills.' Today, however, there is a burgeoning recognition that "no particular government agency or group of agencies
. . . is wise or knowledgeable enough to make the judgments
without informed citizen participation." 2 Thus, decisionmakers,
scholars, and others concerned with effective, equitable administrative process have endeavored to increase public participation in
agency procedures.
There have been many forceful arguments regarding the bene* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
A.B., Stanford Univ. (1961); J.D., University of Santa Clara School of Law (1977); J.S.M.,
Stanford University School of Law (1979).
I. Charles Reich refers to this concept as the "central myth" in our administrative
process. Reich, The Law ofthe Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1236 (1966).
2. Murphy & Hoffman, Current Modelsfor Improving Public Representation in the
Administrative Process, 28 AD. L. REv. 391, 392 (1976).
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fits of increased public participation: greater agency responsive-

ness to the public,3 legitimization of agency discretion through
consideration of all interests,4 increased confidence in government,5 and more diligence by the agencies themselves.6 Yet, perhaps the most significant reason for recent attempts to develop
greater public participation is the widespread recognition of the
"capture phenomenon"-that an agency, exposed to the views of

those groups subject to its regulation (hereinafter "industries"),
will tend to adopt rules which reflect the industries' points of
view.7
The perceived bias of agency decisions is not a product of cor-

ruption or collusion, but rather a natural result of the decisionmaking process. As with other decisionmakers, agency staffs'

"perspectives are limited by the information that is available to
them, and their attitudes are shaped by the rewards and feedback
that our system provides to them." 8 The regulated industries have
the resources to participate vigorously in the process at every
level.9 Thus, due to such vigorous participation and the inability

of opposing viewpoints to participate effectively,' 0 agency staffs
will, in many instances, depend on information supplied by the
industries. "
3. See generally Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 525-31 (1972).
4. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1712 (1975).
5. Id. at 1761. Yet, such claims of increased citizen involvement may be overstated
since most citizens are probably unaware of the efforts of citizen groups on their behalf. Id.
at 1767.
6. Lenny, The Casefor Funding Citizen Particiation in the Administrative Process, 28
AD. L. REV. 483 (1976).
7. Cramton, supra note 3, at 529.
8. Id. at 529-30.
9. For a penetrating analysis of the advantages of the use of financial resources in
decisionmaking, see Galanter, Why the 'Waves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974). One agency has noted the resulting
imbalance:
Consumer advocacy before the FDA [Food and Drug Administration] is rare,
sporadic, and virtually always underfinanced, while the regulated industries
maintain continuous and well-financed advocacy directly and through their trade
associations. (One measure of this imbalance is FDA's Public Calendar, which
indicates constant and routine contacts between members of the regulated industries, and only occasional contacts with nonindustry spokespersons.)
41 Fed. Reg. 35,855 at 35,857 (1976).
10. Public Particpation in FederalAgency Proceedings Act of1977- Hearings on S.270
Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings 1]
(statement of Calvin J. Collier).
11. See Bloch & Stein, The Public Counsel Concept in Practice: The Regional Rail

PUBLIC INTEREST INTERVENTION

Increased participation by non-industry interests may foster a
better balance in administrative decisions by offering a greater
range of ideas, 12 and an opportunity to consider alternatives not
previously advanced, thus encouraging more decisions that are in

the "public interest." Agencies may be willing to take a broader
outlook if non-industry groups can provide new political support.
Moreover, simply placing more points of view on the record may
have the pragmatic effect of forcing agencies to give consideration
3
to those views in order to avoid reversal on review.'

Increased participation by those representing non-industry interests is advocated not only by those in academia.

Deci-

sionmakers within the agencies also recognize the need for
additional points of view. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, which reviews Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) licensing decisions, "has stated on numerous occasions

that citizen participation in their proceedings has been extremely
useful, has developed safety questions which otherwise would not
have been developed, and has improved the safety of nuclear reReorganization,4ctof1973, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215, 216 (1974); Cramton, supra note
3, at 529; Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1074
(1971); Stewart, supra note 4, at 1777.
12. Gellhom, PublicParticipationinAdministrativeProceedings,81 YALE L.J. 359, 381
n.90 (1972).
13. Note, FederalAgency Assistance to Impecunious Intervenors, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1815, 1817 (1975). A collateral issue pervading any discussion of whether and how the
public should participate in agency proceedings is who should represent the public in such
proceedings. Although the agency in many cases represents the public through statutory
mandates to determine what is in the "public interest," see note 16 infra, getting greater
participation by representatives from so-called "public interest groups" seems to be the
objective of those wishing greater public participation in agency proceedings. One commentary has noted several characteristics of such groups: large, impecunious membership
(e.g., welfare recipients); large, wealthy membership with small or non-economic individual interests (e.g., environmentalists); dispersed, small membership suffering great hardship
(e.g., persons with uncommon handicaps); or membership which is not easily organized
(e.g., institutionalized persons). R. FRANK, J. ONEK & J. STEINBERG, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS (1977), reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10,
at 555, 589.
Notably, critics of such groups claim that they do not represent the public interest but
rather represent private, special interests of their own. See HearingsI, supra note 10, at 83
(questions of Senator Thurmond), 132 (statement of David B. Graham). Yet, such criticism merely demonstrates the difficulty in defining the "public interest." Commentators
indicate that "public interest" as used by these groups (and perhaps as best formulated by
agencies) is not a uniform, consistent, monolithic theme, or abstract formula to impose on
society, Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 360, but rather a commitment to the idea that "everyone affected by corporate or bureaucratic decisions should have a voice in those decisions,
even if he cannot obtain conventional legal representation." Halpern & Cunningham, Refections on the New Public Interest Law Theory and Practiceat the Centerfor Law and
Social Policy, 59 GEO. L.J. 1095, 1109 (1971).
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actors."' 4 Rush Moody, a Federal Power Commission (FPC)

Commissioner, believes that "most administrators and regulators
recognize that opening of the administrative process yields better

results, both procedurally and substantively, than attempted
5

maintenance of a closed system."'
While many procedural and legal issues which once presented
serious barriers to public participation have been surmounted,' 6
14. HearingsI, supra note 10, at 84 (statement of Anthony Z. Roisman).
15. Panel II, Standing,Particiationand Who Pays? 26 AD. L. REV. 423, 451 (1974)
(statement of Rush Moody, Jr.).
16. Traditionally, the major barrier to increased participation in the administrative
process has been a narrow interpretation of standing-the interest required to intervene in
agency proceedings, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976), or to gain judicial review of agency decisions, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). A major breakthrough for public participation came in 1966
in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). In that case the court rejected the idea that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) could adequately represent the public interest. ld.at 1003. For a discussion of statutory agency mandates which require agencies to act in the public interest as a
formula for providing the agency with sufficient discretion to act effectively without overstepping congressional authority through a delegation of policymaking power, see Reich,
supra note 1,at 1233. Cf.Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608,
620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) where the court said that an agency's
role in representing the public interest "does not permit it to act as an umpire blandly
calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right must receive active
and affirmative protection at the hands of the [agency] .. "
The court in United Church of Christ held that "some 'audience participation' must be
allowed in license renewal proceedings." 359 F.2d at 1005. Noting that such public intervention would create problems for the Commission, the court suggested the development
of formalized standards "to regulate and limit public intervention to spokesmen who can
be helpful." Id. The court approved of the FCC criterion and determined that the appellants were "responsible spokesmen for representative groups having significant roots in the
listening community." Id. This standard was appealing to those wishing greater public
participation in agency proceedings since it seemingly eliminated "the distinction between
the intervenor and the 'ordinary' member of the public," a distinction which was formerly
required for standing since a member of the public per se had no particular interest to
represent. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts,Agencies andArbitrators,
81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 729-30 (1968).
Four years after United Church of Christ, the Supreme Court further liberalized the
requirements for standing. In Association of Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970) the Court, referring to the Administrative Procedure Act, stated the test as "whether
the interest sought to be protected by the Complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id.
at 153. In a later case, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the Court made clear
that non-economic interests such as "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational," were included in the standing test. Id. at 154.
The advent of these cases and subsequent agency regulations assure that standing is no
longer the primary obstacle to increased public participation it once was. See, e.g., 10
C.F.R. § 2.714 (1978) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)); 14 C.F.R. § 302.15 (1978)
(Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)); 18 C.F.R. § 1.8 (1979) (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) (formerly the Federal Power Commission)); 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (1978)
(FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 1100.70 (1978) (Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)).
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citizen groups seeking to participate in the administrative process

still face significant practical obstacles-particularly costs. Although limited forms of participation, such as submitting a written
statement of position or testifying at a hearing, are feasible for the

most impecunious of groups, such procedures simply do not constitute "effective advocacy" of an interest in this context. To make
a real impact on the record upon which the agency decision must

rest, public interest groups must take advantage of all available
methods of participation in regulatory proceedings.17
Activities which constitute effective advocacy include gathering factual data to present alterative solutions, providing expert

witnesses, and hiring attorneys skilled at both effectively representing their interests, and cross-examining staff and industry witnesses. 8 Such participation entails a "serious commitment of

personnel, resources, and finances."' 9 The cost of active intervention in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) license renewal proceeding has been estimated to be from $350,000 to
$400,000.20 Similar intervention in a Food and Drug Administra-

tion (FDA) rulemaking proceeding would cost $30,000-$40,000.21
Transcript costs, multiple-copy requirements, and expert witness'
and attorneys' fees constitute the primary expenses.

A copy of the transcript is essential for effective participation
in an ongoing proceeding. Agencies contract with private companies for transcripts, and the costs per page vary widely depending

on the terms of the contract. 22 Since an average hearing day produces approximately 100 pages of transcript, 23 the costs can be
significant. Even a relatively short hearing of one or two weeks

17. Hearings I, supra note 10, at 54 (statement of William J. Scott); Cramton, supra
note 3, at 539. See also Galanter, supra note 9.
18. Cross-examination can be a particularly important device "to prevent broader issues from being obscured by a narrow focus on technical matters, to prevent factual inconsistencies from being buried in the record and to bring out pro-industry orientation of
expert witnesses or staff witnesses." Comment, Public Participationin FederalAdministralive Proceedings, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 702, 744 (1972).
19. Hearings ,supra note 10, at 54 (statement of William J. Scott).
20. Comment, supra note 18, at 771 n.466.
21. Cramton, supra note 3, at 538.
22. Costs also depend upon how quickly the transcript is needed: "ordinary" delivery
(5-10 days) varies from 28¢-95¢ per page; next day delivery, 64T,-$1.85 per page; and "immediate" delivery (same day), 840-$3.00 per page. Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 391 n.122.
A more recent study reported that costs were as high as $4.00 per page in some cases. T.
BOASBERG, L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KASS, REPORT TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION: POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY INTERVENOR REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN NRC PROCEEDINGS 133-34 (1975).

23. Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 392.
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will produce between 500 and 1,000 pages of transcript, placing a
heavy financial burden on citizen intervenor groups. 24 Commentators have persuasively argued that transcript costs should be
considered a legitimate cost of the agency responsible for the hearings and that copies should be made available to participants at
the cost of reproduction.

Multiple copy rules also add to participation costs. For example, both the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Federal En-

ergy Regulatory Commission (FERC) require that nineteen copies
of all documents be filed. 26 The Administrative Conference of the
United States has recommended that such requirements be

waived in cases where it is "burdensome" and that all "filing and
distribution requirements should be re-examined.

' 27

Alterna-

tively, like transcript costs, it seems that duplication costs for
meeting these requirements should be borne by the agencies re-

sponsible for the hearings to encourage public participation.28
As may be expected, costs of gathering information and pro-

ducing expert witnesses are also burdensome to citizens groups.
Fees for experts range from anywhere between $2,500 and $5,000
in FDA proceedings to $50,000 in large Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) rate investigations.2 9 One commentator has
suggested requiring agencies to assist public interest groups by
providing access to government information and experts.3" Others
24. T. BOASBERG, L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, at 134.
25. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 28,

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 4 (1971), reprintedin T. BOASBERG,
L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, app. F [hereinafter cited as RECOMMENDATION 28]; Cramton, supra note 3, at 539; Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 392-93.
26. 14 C.F.R. § 302.3(c) (1978) (CAB); 18 C.F.R. § 1.15(b) (1979) (FERC).
27. RECOMMENDATION 28, supra note 25, at 4, reprintedin T. BOASBERG, L. HEWES,

N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, app. F.
28. Some agencies have addressed this problem; the FDA, for example, adopted a
regulation in 1977 giving the Commissioner the discretionary power to exempt needy participants from multiple copy rules. 21 C.F.R. § 12.82 (1979).
29. Cramton, supra note 3, at 540. Aside from the financial inaccessibility of experts
for most public interest intervenors, there is a political dilemma. Commentators have observed that many experts are reluctant to assist citizen groups because the experts feel that
identification with the views of those opposing the regulated industry will jeopardize their
prospects of employment. Id.; see also Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 393.
30. Id. at 393-94. The Administrative Conference of the United States has suggested
that each "agency should experiment with allowing access to agency experts and making
available experts whose testimony would be helpful in another agency's proceeding." RECOMMENDATION 28, supra note 25, at 4, reprintedin T. BOASBERG, L. HEWES, N. KLORES &
B. KASS, supra note 22, app. F. Cf.Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
This Act directs agencies to disclose information to any "person," unless such information
is specifically exempted.

PUBLIC INTEREST INTERVENTION

disagree with this idea arguing that such a requirement would
threaten an agency's ability to control its own operations and personnel. 3 Apart from its effect on the agency, such access could
adversely affect the hearing process itself. If the information is
used for cross-examination purposes, or as the basis of additional
information, it will be beneficial; however, if participants rely simply on agency information and experts, failing to develop the information which they could otherwise do by virtue of their unique
position, the purpose of increased public participation will be subverted.32
The largest expenses for intervention in major proceedings are
attorneys' fees, which may, in major proceedings, exceed
$100,000. 33 Not surprisingly, the issue of how (and whether) to
help meet this expense has engendered considerable controversy.
Critics of rules which provide for attorney fee compensation to
groups participating in rulemaking or other administrative procedures have derided such provisions as "full employment bill[s] for
lawyers." 34 Yet, such provisions have precedents in civil rights
and antitrust statutes 35 -areas in which they serve a similarly important function.
From the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that the major
obstacle to effective public participation is the cost of such activity. Faced with potentially enormous costs and the inability to
pass such costs on to their constituencies, "public interest"-ie.,
non-industry-representatives cannot reasonably be expected to
intervene in agency proceedings unless they receive financial
assistance.36 Thus, to counteract the effects of an imbalanced
decisionmaking process, which is characterized by the "capture
phenomenon, '37 efforts have been initiated to provide public
funds for public intervention in federal agency proceedings.
This paper analyzes recent efforts to provide public funds to
finance citizen group participation in federal agency proceedings.
First, the experience of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
31. T. BOASBERG, L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KAss, supra note 22, at 135.
32. Id., app. F at 7 (statement of Harold L. Russell).
33. Gellhorn, su.pra note 12, at 394.
34. Schotland, After 25 Years: We Come to Praisethe.4P.4 andNot to Bury It, 24 AD.
L. REv. 261, 273 (1972).
35. Id.
36. T. BOASBERG, L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KAss, supra note 22, app. F at 5 (statement of John A. Briggs).
37. See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
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its compensation program will be examined.3" This was the first
comprehensive statutory program for funding participation in
rulemaking. The focus of the analysis then shifts to an evaluation
of a recent congressional attempt to apply a program, similar to
that developed by the FTC, to all agencies and all types of proceedings.39 Hopefully, this discussion will enable decisionmakers
to intelligently consider better methods for public access to agency
procedures.
I.

THE

FTC

PROGRAM

The FTC experience with public funding originated in American Chinchilla Corp.,4 0 where the Commission ruled that an indigent respondent was entitled to appointed counsel.4" Shortly
thereafter, a group of students petitioned for FTC funds to intervene in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,4 2 thus prompting the Commission to seek the opinion of the Comptroller General regarding
the Commission's authority to reimburse the expenses of indigent
intervenors. He replied in the affirmative, stating that the Commission had the power to make funds available for such purposes
under its authority to "assure proper case preparation."4 3
With the path at least nominally clear for partial funding by
the Commission, it remained for Congress to authorize the FTC
to institute its current, more comprehensive program of funding
intervention in the public interest.
A.

Eligibility Standards

The current program began in January, 1975 when
enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
sion Improvement Act44 and granted explicit statutory
to the FTC to compensate participants in rulemaking

Congress
Commisauthority
proceed-

38. See notes 40-101 infra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 102-256 infra and accompanying text.
40. 76 F.T.C. 1016 (1969) (order which prohibited misrepresentation in the sale of
chinchilla breeding stock).
41. Id.
42. 77 F.T.C. 1666 (1970) (order allowing intervenors to represent the public interest
by participation in certain procedures).
43. Letter from Comptroller General Elmer Staats to FTC Chairman Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Aug. 10, 1972, at 2-3, reprintedin 31 AD. L.2d 474-75 (1973).
44. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (1976)).
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ings.45 Specifically, the statute gave authority to the FTC to provide compensation for costs of participation in rulemaking
proceedings to (1) "any person", (2) who represents an interest, (3)
which would not otherwise have been "adequately represented",
and (4) which was "necessary for a fair determination of the
rulemaking proceeding taken as a whole." 46 Such persons would

also have to be unable to participate effectively but for such compensation.47 Originally, the Commission delegated authority for
the program to its Bureau of Consumer Protection. 8 Later, these

functions were assumed by the Commission's General Counsel.

9

The Bureau established application procedures and guidelines ac-

cording to its interpretation of the statutory language."

Relying

on the language of the Conference report, which indicated that the

purpose of the program was "to provide to the extent possible that
all affected interests be represented in rulemaking proceedings so
that rules adopted thereunder best serve the public interest
*. . ,"'5, the Bureau gave a broad interpretation to the eligibility
standards enunciated in the statute.
45. Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(h), 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1976)).

This section provides:
(1) The Commission may, pursuant to rules prescribed by it, provide com-

pensation for reasonable attorneys fees, expert witness fees, and other costs of
participating in a rulemaking proceeding under this section to any person (A)
who has, or represents, an interest (i) which would not otherwise be adequately
represented in such proceeding, and (ii) representation of which is necessary for a
fair determination of the rulemaking proceeding taken as a whole, and (B) who is
unable effectively to participate in such proceeding because such person cannot
afford to pay costs of making oral presentations, conducting cross-examination,
and making rebuttal submissions in such proceeding.
(2) The aggregate amount of compensation paid under this subsection in any
fiscal year to all persons who, in rulemaking proceedings in which they receive
compensation, are persons who either (A) would be regulated by the proposed
rule, or (B) represent persons who would be so regulated, may not exceed 25
percent of the aggregate amount paid as compensation under this subsection to all
persons in such fiscal year.
(3) The aggregate amount of compensation paid to all persons in any fiscal
year under this subsection may not exceed $1,000,000.
15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1976).
46. Id. at § 57a(h)(l).
47. Id.

48. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1978).
49. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(d)(1), (2) (1979).
50. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N,

RULEMAKING

AND

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

UNDER THE FTC IMPROVEMENT ACT (1977) [hereinafter cited as FTC, RULEMAKING],
reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 376-400; FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, APPLYING
FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF FTC RULEMAKING PARTICIPATION (1977)[hereinafter cited as
FTC, REIMBURSEMENT], reprintedin Hearings1, supra note 10, at 401-17.
51. FTC, RULEMAKING, supranote 50, at 13, reprinted in HearingsI, supra note 10, at

389.
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First, by reference to definitions in the Administrative Procedure Act,52 the Bureau interpreted the phrase "any person" to include any entity, except a part of the executive branch of the
federal government.5 3 Second, the Bureau determined that any
"person" who might be "crucially affected" by a proceeding had a
sufficient "interest. '5 4 Third, a representative provided "adequate

representation" of a particular interest only if that party could
make a significant contribution which was competent, but not duplicative of other efforts.5 5 Fourth, if the rule significantly affected
the interest represented, then the representation was "necessary
56
for a fair determination."

In summary, an applicant must show that it represents a
"unique" interest that will be affected by the proposed rule and

that it can provide a significant contribution to the proceeding.
The language concerning financial requirements for funding
eligibility5 7 has proven more nebulous, and the Bureau's interpre52. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), (2) (1976).
53. FTC, RULEMAKING, supra note 50, at 13, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at
389.
Within the first two years of the program approximately $800,000 was allocated to
thirty different applicants, mostly groups, in thirteen rulemaking proceedings. See Hearings I, supra note 10, at 23-29 (statement of Calvin J. Collier). This does not mean individuals were by-passed by the system. For example, during the hearings on the proposed
hearing aid industry rules, the National Council of Senior Citizens, as part of its participation in the compensation program, brought nine elderly consumers to Washington to testify. In the view of the Council, the presentation of "real life experiences" added a "vital
element" to the hearings and "enabled individuals on low, fixed incomes to personally take
part in a decision-making process which would usually be far removed from them." Id. at
247 (letter from the National Council of Senior Citizens, Inc.).
Presumably, this interpretation of "any person" would also include state agencies and
state attorneys general. See id. at 409. Although the records do not reveal whether state
representatives have yet applied for FTC funds, see id. at 23-29, many state officials have
indicated that states definitely feel a need to be included in federal financing programs. See
id. at 45 (statement of William J. Scott, Attorney General, State of Illinois); id. at 70 (statement of Stanley C. Van Ness, New Jersey Public Advocate); id. at 187 (telegram from Carl
R. Ajello, Attorney General for the State of Connecticut).
54. FTC, RULEMAKING, supra note 50, at 16, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at
391.
55. Id. at 18-20, reprintedin Hearings1, supra note 10, at 393-95.
56. Id. at 17-18, reprinted in HearingsI, supra note 10, at 392-93.
57. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra. The statute provides that up to twentyfive percent of the available funds may go to persons subject to the proposed rule. 15
U.S.C. § 57a(h)(2) (1976). Yet, the regulations are silent on this part of the program. The
Bureau guidelines merely state that "[s]uch application should be made on the same forms
and will be treated in the same manner as any other application." FTC, REIMBURSEMENT,
supra note 50, at 8, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 401, 408. Experience has
shown, however, that representatives of such groups seldom apply. When they have ap-
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tation has been the target of criticism. 8 While it is clear that an
indigent would qualify and a wealthy applicant would not, the
vast majority of applicants fall in a gray area between those extremes. According to the Bureau regulations, one factor to be
evaluated is the size of the applicant's economic stake in the interest compared to the cost of participation. 9 The Bureau interprets
this language to mean that even if the aggregate economic stake is
large, if it is dispersed so that each individual has little incentive to
participate, the applicant may qualify.6" Thus, it is the Bureau's
view that the statute does not prohibit compensation by the Commission to "established groups which have been able to maintain
themselves through general public subscriptions, foundation
t
grants, sale of consumer goods, or services or other devices."'
This position is unacceptable to many. For example, the FTC
was criticized by Senator Thurmond for funding Consumers
Union, which he called "a major business enterprise with over two
million subscribers to its magazine ....-62 FTC Chairman Collier responded by noting that the crucial question was whether the
group could effectively participate without financial assistance. He
explained that the answer to that question "does not necessarily
turn on a balance sheet."6 3

In other subsequent comments, the FTC revealed additional
justifications for including groups such as Consumers Union:
It is not in the public interest that an organization with the experience and reputation of Consumers Union be forced to

spend itself into destitution before it becomes eligible. Nor is it
of the benefits of
in the public interest that agencies be deprived 64

Consumers Union's expertise and knowledge.
Notably, applications must explain why compensation is necessary-including detailed information on the applicant's current
budget, a financial statement regarding sources of funds and commitments to other activities, and the feasibility of individual conplied, they have had difficulty meeting the eligibility requirements apparently due to their
presumed access to adequate private funding. See notes 65 & 76 infra.
58. See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text.
59. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(d)(l) (1979).
60. FTC, RULEMAKING, supra note 50, at 23, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at

390.
61.
62.
63.
64.

FTC).

Id. at 24, reprintedin Hearings , supra note 10, at 399.
HearingsI, supra note 10, at 9 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 40 (Response to Additional Questions of Senator Kennedy Submitted to the
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tributions towards the costs of participation.6 5

B.

Types of ParicpationCovered

Participation which qualifies for funding takes several forms
and may take place at various stages of the proceeding. 66 Imme-

diately after publication in the Federal Register of the initial notice of a proposed rulemaking, the Commission accepts written
statements of opinions and arguments on all issues of fact, law, or
policy. 67 At this time, groups or individuals may present requests
for designation of specific issues for cross-examination and may
begin developing factual data.68 During the hearing, participants

may appear as witnesses to present testimony or factual information developed in studies, present expert witnesses, and cross-examine other witnesses. 69 Rebuttal arguments may be prepared
and post-hearing comments may be submitted for the record.7 °
65. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(c) (1979). Demonstrating the infeasibility of raising funds
may be one of the major stumbling blocks for representatives of regulated interests. Robert
Lee, testifying on behalf of the National Hearing Aid Society, said that his conclusion on
why the Society did not receive an unconditional approval for funds from the FTC was
that "we were businessmen and had the capability of raising the necessary funds if we
chose to do so." Public Participationin FederalAgencyProceedingsAct of 1977" Hearings
on S. 270 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judicary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 2, at 15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings 11] (statement of Robert W. Lee). In fact, the exchange of correspondence between
the Society and the FTC indicates that the Society had begun a fund raising campaign,
which was ultimately successful, among its members at the time of its application. Although the FTC had approved the Society's application for $38,000, the group did not
receive any funds from the FTC since the Society could--thanks to its fund raising-participate without such funds. See id. at 350-87.
Given this experience, it certainly seems possible that a requirement which allows compensation only if participation would be otherwise impossible "might create a negative
incentive to energetic solicitation efforts" as well as reduce the incentives for individuals to
contribute to such organizations. Hearings I, supra note 10, at 285 (letter from the Air
Transport Association).
66. FTC, REIMBURSEMENT, supra note 50, at 1, reprintedin Hearings1, supra note 10,
at 401. Applications for funding may be accepted immediately after publication of the
proposed rule in the Federal Register. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(c) (1979). Applications are first
reviewed by the Presiding Officer for the proceeding, id. § I.17(d)(1); the final decision had
been made by the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(d)
(1978), but is now made by the Commission's General Counsel. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(d)(2)
(1979). The staff will discuss any problems in the application with the applicant, and application policy permits unlimited re-applications; in addition, regulations and guidelines
have been developed for the evaluation of applications. Id. § 1.17(d), (e).
67. FTC, RULEMAKING, supra note 50, at 7, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at
382.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 9, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 384. For a list of the kinds of

1979]

PUBLIC INTEREST INTERVENTION

Guidelines formulated by the Bureau expressly exclude compensation for three types of particular expenses: the costs incurred in

petitioning the Commission to initiate a rulemaking proceeding,
the cost of applying for funds under this program, and the cost of
judicial review of a Commission decision.7 ' Such activities either

thus, are not
precede or follow the rulemaking proceeding and,
72
se.
per
rulemaking
in
participation
as
interpreted
C. Expenses Covered

A group may decide to participate in one or several of the various stages of a proceeding. 73 An eligible applicant may be compensated for costs incurred in any phase of its participation.7 4

Those costs must be actually incurred (verified by receipts and
records) and must be "reasonable." 75 According to FTC regulations, travel expenses (transportation, meals, and lodging) are limited to those acceptable under government standards. Civil
service salaries are used to determine "market rates" for payments

to third parties. Current regulations and guidelines also provide
that attorneys' fees "at a rate in excess of $50 per hour will be
considered presumptively unreasonable ... ,76
Similarly, the regulations provide that experts and consultants

"will be compensated at a rate not to exceed the highest rate at
which experts and consultants to the Commission are compensated." 77 Compensation is available for the costs of staff employparticipation involved in FTC rulemaking, see HearingsI, supra note 10, at 35-37 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
71. FTC, RULEMAKING, supra note 50, at 11-12, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note
10, at 386-87.
72. 1d. at 12, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 387.
73. Id. at 6-10, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 381-85.
74. Id. at 11-12, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 386-87.
75. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(e) (1979).
76. Id. § 1.17(e)(2). However, the Bureau, using civil service salary equivalents based
on numbers of years of experience, has devised a chart of maximum amounts and has not
reimbursed more than $42 per hour. See Hearings I, supra note 10, at 415. In practice this
is interpreted to mean not only that the amount reimbursed cannot exceed the limit, but
that the group cannot pay more than the maximum amount. See Attachment to Letter to
Anthony Di Rocco from Margery Waxman Smith, July 20, 1976, reprintedin HearingsII,
supra note 65, at 305. The National Hearing Aid Society complained that the FTC limitations "substantially, if not entirely, foreclose use of the funds allocated to NHAS." Letter
to Margery W. Smith from Anthony Di Rocco, Aug. 4, 1976, reprintedinid. at 374. NHAS
complained that the "maximum billable rates by our attorneys simply does not make
sense. . . . This proviso effectively precludes any organization from retaining outside
counsel in connection with its participation in an FTC rulemaking proceeding." Id. at 375.
At the time of this exchange the FTC had limited attorneys' fees to $75 per hour.
77. 16 C.F.R. § I.17(e)(2) (1979).
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ees of citizen groups (including attorneys) based on their actual
salaries plus overhead (figured at twenty-five percent of the employee's hourly rate) and fringe benefits.7 8 Secretarial time is not
included in overhead and may be budgeted separately at six dollars per hour.79 All personnel are asked to sign statements regarding the number of hours devoted to the participation and the
nature of their work.8 0 To ease the job of accounting for expenditures, the Bureau suggests that applicants maintain separate bank
accounts for reimbursable expenses. 8 ' Records must be kept for
three years.82
D. Advance Payments
Applicants may also submit periodic requests for reimbursement without waiting until the end of their participation.8 3 The
regulations provide for advance payments "where necessary to
permit effective participation in the rulemaking proceeding."8 4
Under this very flexible clause, the Bureau will advance up to fifty
percent of the amount approved for use. This, combined with
periodic reimbursements, enables even very low-budget groups to
participate.86
The FTC staff has had a favorable initial experience with its
compensation program. The staff believes that the funded groups
have not only "developed information, proposed evidence and
conducted surveys for the record which have added materially to
the quality of the records in the rulemaking proceedings,"8 7 but
88
also have provided views differing from those of the FTC staff.
Commenting on the hearings on the Funeral Industry Rule,
78. FTC, REIMBURSEMENT, supra note 50, at 7, 15, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note
10, at 407, 415.
79. Id. at 16, reprintedin Hearings , supra note 10, at 416.
80. Id. at 10, reprintedin Hearings1, supra note 10, at 410.
81. Id. at 10-11, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 410-11.
82. Id. at 11, reprintedin Hearings , supra note 10, at 411.
83. Because of the length of time involved in a rulemaking proceeding, this is undoubtedly crucial to any group needing funds in order to participate. Of the thirteen FTC
rulemaking proceedings initiated between the passage of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act in 1975 and the time of recent hearings, none had been
completed by mid-1977. See Hearings , supra note 10, at 7 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
84. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(e)(1) (1979).
85. FTC, REIMBURSEMENT, supra note 50, at 9, reprintedin Hearings-, supra note 10,
at 409.
86. Id.

87. Hearings , supra note 10, at 7 (statement of James V. DeLong).
88.

Id. at 12 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
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Chairman Collier echoed similar sentiments: none of the six
groups that participated under the compensation program "hesitated to object to FTC staff positions or to take independent
89
ones."
There are, however, weaknesses in the FTC program that
should be considered before its wholesale adoption as a model for
other agencies. One of the most basic limitations of the FTC program is that it applies only to rulemaking. This limit was no
doubt a result of the FTC's interpretation of its power-since the
program was part of a bill which gave the FTC rulemaking authority, the program extends only as far as the bill. Viewed in a
positive light, such proceedings were obviously a logical starting
point for a federal funding program for several reasons.
Rulemaking is plainly a legislative activity. Consequently, the
broadest spectrum of ideas should be heard in any such process.
One scholar has suggested that in rulemaking hearings, agencies
should try to duplicate the political process-encouraging participation by "individuals and groups, whether or not directly affected by the rule."9 Input from as many interests as possible is
particularly important in the administrative context since agency
decisionmakers are not accountable at the ballot box. Another
factor favoring increased participation in rulemaking is that the
resulting "decisions are difficult to collaterally attack on judicial
review or challenge in future agency adjudications."'"
Yet, the existence of these positive aspects of participation in
rulemaking in no way justifies limiting participation to such proceedings. Important policy decisions are made in many kinds of
non-rulemaking agency proceedings. For example, the FTC has
often used unfair trade cases (technically enforcement proceedings) to establish new trade-practice rules.9 2 In addition, FTC officials have indicated that participation funding should be
extended beyond rulemaking proceedings, noting that "[p]ublic
representation can be just as valuable in other proceedings, such
as licensing or adjudication."93
E. Control Within Each Agency
Another problem inherent in the FTC compensation program,
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 20 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
Cramton, supra note 3, at 531.
T. BOASBERG, L. HEwas, N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, at 58-59.
Cramton, supra note 3, at 533.
HearingsI, supra note 10, at 39 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
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identified by FTC Chairman Collier, is the fact that it is administered by the agency itself. Under FTC procedures, the staff working on the rule is not involved in the compensation program.
Nonetheless, funding decisions are made within the agency and
that may, in the words of Chairman Collier, "give rise to an appearance of favoritism for one group whose views might be
deemed acceptable," 94 which, in the long run, may give rise to
distortion of the program.95
The FTC has already been accused of using the compensation
program to bolster support for a rule favored by its staff. A representative of the National Hearing Aid Society claimed that the
proposed rule concerning the hearing aid industry "was punitive
in nature," and that although they had "no knowledge of what
transpires within the FTC decisionmaking processes," it was the
Society's opinion that the compensation program was not administered with "an even approach." 96
Such charges seem inevitable in a situation where compensation awards are being made within the agency. Because of the
requirement that no compensation will be granted if the applicant
could participate without funding,97 it will be difficult for any regulated group to qualify for funds. 98 Therefore, from their point of
view, the agency is proposing a new rule against them (any new
regulation will likely be viewed that way by the regulated interests) and in addition, is paying for other groups to back up the
agency's position.
Furthermore, with funding administered within the agency,
there is a danger (also borne out by FTC experience) of confusion
between the compensation program and regular staff investigations. As part of its normal preparation for such hearings, the staff
is responsible for developing information for the record and procuring witnesses and consultants. An article by James J. Kilpatrick accused the FTC staff of spending $440,000 in order to
"round up a host of favorable witnesses to support the proposed
trade rule for the funeral industry." 99 Chairman Collier protested
that that activity had nothing to do with the compensation program and that the FTC never solicits applications for that pro94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 7 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
Id. (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
HearingsII, supra note 65, at 15 (statement of Robert W. Lee).
See notes 59-65 sapra and accompanying text.
See notes 57, 65 supra.
HearingsI, supra note 10, at 10 (statement of Senator Strom Thurmond).
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gram.'" Yet, critics remained unconvinced, claiming that the
FTC "can go out and pay somebody to come in.
whatever group [it wanted] . . .them to."''

.

.and represent

Such charges could undermine all efforts to seek greater public
participation in agency proceedings through financing the activities of public interest representatives. Even if unfounded, they
may engender considerable lack of confidence in the system. One
way to minimize the problem would be to administer the compensation program from outside of the agency, even though an
outside group would not be as familiar with the issues raised in
the proceedings. The application process might be somewhat
lengthier as a result, but that would be an acceptable price for
increased confidence in the system.
II. S. 270:

THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL AGENCY
PROCEEDINGS ACT OF 1977

Based on findings that "effective functioning of the administrative process"' 0 2 requires agencies to "seek the views of all affected citizens," ' 03 and that access to the process "is frequently an
exclusive function of a person's ability to meet high costs of participation,"'" the authors of Senate Bill 270 of the 95th Congress
(S.
270) sought to establish a compensation program for all federal
agencies similar to the program developed by the FTC. Although
S. 270"was not passed by the 95th Congress,'0 5 it provides a good
model for future proposals. This paper next discusses and evaluates S.270. The discussion emphasizes a comparison of the approach taken by S.270 with that of the FTC program already
examined.
A. Eligibility Standards
The basic criterion of eligibility in S.270 was whether the applicant could make a "substantial contribution" to the proceeding.
Although this language did not parallel the FTC statutory language,' 0 6 it incorporated the test actually used by the FTC. 10 7 The
100.
101.
102.
at 96.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 13 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
Id. at 12 (statement of Senator Strom Thurmond).
Sess. § 2(a) (1977), reprintedin HearingsII, supra note 65,
S.270, 95th Cong., Ist
Id.
Id.
This bill was not reported out of committee.
See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
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language of the FTC Act in focusing on the "interest" of the applicant, provides that such an interest must not only be "adequately represented"' 8 by the applicant but also that the
representation of such interest by the applicant must be "necessary for a fair determination."' 9 In its interpretation of this standard, the FTC considerably reduced the complexities of the
statutory formula, providing in its guidelines that anyone affected
by a proposed rule who can make a significant contribution to the
proceeding satisfies this part of the test.'1 o
The S. 270 approach seems preferable not only because it is
more direct, but also because it focuses attention on the purpose of
participation: to accommodate applicants who have a contribution which would be a valuable addition to the proceeding."'
The legislation enumerated several factors for determining
whether an applicant could be expected to make a substantial contribution: the likelihood that the interest is already adequately
represented, the number and complexity of issues involved, the
importance of encouraging public participation (that is, evaluating
whether the public has sufficient economic incentive to participate
as individuals), and the need for presentation of a fair balance of
interests." 2 The Act did not specify how this list was to be utilized.
A list of express criteria to consider is meritorious since it directs the agencies to weigh various factors, yet leaves agencies free
to exercise discretion. The first factor (whether the interest is already represented), for example, may be appropriately used to
deny compensation when an applicant has nothing new to add to
the record. There may be times, however, when "the intensity and
' 3
concern of several intervenors may be cumulatively valuable" "
even if duplicative to some extent. In such a situation, the agency
could simply place limits on the intervenors' presentations to
avoid undue delay.
S. 270 also required that the applicant be an "effective repre108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
98-99.
113.

15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1976).
Id.
See note 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
See Hearings , supra note 10, at 69 (statement of Stanley C. VanNess).
S. 270, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin Hearings II, supra note 65, at
Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 382.
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sentative."tI 4 This standard would presumably require an agency
to evaluate organizational representatives in terms of their constituencies, accountability, and capability."I5 The FTC, for example,

similarly gathers information such as the number of members,
amount of dues, and whether the officers are elected. 16 This kind

of evaluation is difficult, however, when an applicant purports to
represent an interest that traditionally has been unorganized.
Poor people, for example, generally lack an organized voice to express their concerns. Moreover, as one commentator has sug-

gested, "the views of 'poor people's groups', or of the controlling
leadership of such groups, may frequently be out of touch with, or
divergent from, the interests of the mass of the poor."' "17 Thus,

future legislation may well have to take several contending voices
into account as well as the usual criteria for evaluating effectiveness.

Consequently, future proposals should stress that the evaluation of whether a group is an effective representative or whether

an interest is already represented is not intended to result in limiting funding to a single representative per interest. Giving creden-

tials to a single group as "'the' representative of the poor or the
consumer or the public or other citizen interest however characterized"" 8 should be avoided. Such a development would be partic-

ularly disadvantageous for newly-formed local groups without
established records of participation."I9 Under S. 270, these details

were apparently to be left to each agency as it published guidelines for its program. These issues, however, should be uniformly
treated;120 therefore, Congress should provide some direction in
114. S. 270, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin HearingsII, supra note 65, at
98.
115. These standards are similar to those used in the FTC process. See notes 116-17
infra and accompanying text.
116. FTC, RULEMAKING, supra note 50, at 19-21, reprinted in Hearings I, supra note
10, at 395-97.
117. Bonfield, Representationfor the Poor in FederalRulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV.
511, 529 (1969).
118. T. BOASBERG, L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, at app. F at 7
(statement of Malcolm S. Mason).
119. Id. at 74. The Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC), when announcing
its proposed regulations covering funding for participation in informal rulemaking, specifically noted that its criterion of a "capability to represent a point of view. . . does not in
any way require that a participant have such prior experience." 42 Fed. Reg. 15,711 at
15,714 (1977).
120. One witness at the 1976 hearings on a bill similar to S. 270, made the following
observation about the need for uniformity: "If we have different requirements for the several agencies. . . only more Washington lawyers will possess the keys to participation."
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this area in future legislation.
Interestingly, the drafters of S. 270 emphasized the need for

broad public participation by omitting any requirement that an
intervenor's views prevail as a condition for funding. Apparently,
the drafters believed that better decisions would be made if more
views were heard and considered. The crux of the issue is not that
21

someone won or lost, but assuring that no view is left out.'
Thus, any participation that provides an "effective illumination of

matters that result[s] in an improved agency decision should be
22
viewed as a positive contribution."
S. 270 defined "person" with reference to section 551(2) of the
Administrative Procedure Act-the same definition used by the

FTC. 123 Notably, it was not intended to apply only to groups that
have no resources. Although the FTC has been criticized for its
similar interpretation of the financial need requirement in the
FTC statute, 124 the drafters of S. 270 left no doubt that the FTC

approach was preferable. Thus, the bill explicitly allowed funding
of a group if the economic interest of a substantial majority of the
individual members is small compared with the cost of participation. 125 Critics claimed that such language would permit
"wealthy" organizations with diverse financial resources to gain
agency funding and urged that such organizations should not be

eligible for the compensation program. 126 Yet, this concern simply does not seem very compelling. The FTC experience demon-

strates that large groups can contribute significantly to agency
Hearingson S. 2715 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedureof the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976) (statement of Elizabeth
Lederer).
121. Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 380.
122. Cramton, supra note 3, at 545. See also R. FRANK, J. ONEK & J. STEINBERG,
supra note 13, at 114, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 555, 674. As noted above
with the FTC interpretation, see note 53 supra and accompanying text, state and local
government units could be eligible if other criteria are met.
123. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
124. See text accompanying notes 59-65 supra.
125. S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin HearingsII, supra note 65, at
99.
126. HearingsI, supra note 10, at 135 (statement of George Gleason). As an example
of "wealthy groups" that may be funded, Mr. Gleason identified the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) noting from its 1975 audit an income of $1.7 million, including
$1.1 million from foundations. Id. at 138-39. Another witness, however, pointed out that
although NRDC may be considered a "big" environmental group, its total budget for all
nuclear matters is less than half the amount spent by an average utility on one intervention.
Id. at 86 (statement of Anthony Z. Roisman).
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proceedings. It does not seem sensible to require them to meet an
indigency test.
B.

Types of ParticipationCovered

Like the FTC Act, S.270 did not enumerate the types of activities that would be compensated (although of course, the types of
expenses covered provide some guidance). For any bill that covers a wide range of proceedings in all agencies, it would probably
be impossible to draft a meaningful, comprehensive list of all the
possible activities that may be considered as "participation."
Preparation of various written submissions will undoubtedly
qualify as participation under any program. However, in future
legislation, Congress should clarify whether studies, surveys, and
background research are to be considered "participation." Proponents of allowing funding for this purpose have urged that effective participation requires that funds be made available to allow
groups to "dig up new data with which to challenge usual regulator/regulatee [sic] discussions."' 117 However, it may be argued
that since agencies conduct their own studies and investigations,
the compensation program should be used only to assist groups in
presenting data already gathered, and thus, not facilitate their independent research to develop new ideas. Ultimately this issue
may turn on whether intervenors are viewed as auditors or primary researchers.' 28 To assure consistency, Congress should
make its intent on this matter clear.
C. Expenses Covered
Other than attorneys' and experts' fees, S. 270 did not specify
what expenses were to be reimbursed; it merely allowed compensation for "other costs of participation incurred by eligible persons. .... ,t29 Costs for witnesses, travel, and reproduction of
30
documents and transcripts should unquestionably qualify.'
These categories should be specified as covered in future proposals. One witness at the S. 270 hearings felt that the bill should
clarify whether reimbursement would be available to compensate
regular employees of nonprofit groups.' 3 ' The FTC has consis127. Hearings , supra note 10, at 233 (letter from Robert B. Choate).
128. T. BOASBERO, L. HEwEs, N. KLORES & B. KAss, supra note 22, at 171-72.
129. S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin HearingsII, supra note 65, at

97-98.
130.v See notes 17-35 supra and accompanying text.
131. HearingsI, supra note 10, at 101 (statement of William T. Coleman, Jr.).
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32
tently compensated groups for properly documented staff time. 1
Future proposals should clearly state that such compensation is
anticipated since it seems inefficient to require an intervenor to
hire staff on an ad hoc basis for each proceeding in which it participates.
Fees for experts and attorneys were limited by S. 270. As with
the FTC regulations, 33 compensation for experts was not to exceed "the highest rate of compensation for experts and consultants
paid by the agency involved."' 34 Some commentators have suggested that problems could arise concerning the degree of control
an agency has over an intervenor's choice of experts. 13 5 These individuals reason that since an intervenor's experts are supposed to
aid the agency, the agency may perhaps wish to determine
36
whether such experts will, in fact, aid it in its deliberations.
However, agency determination based on the merits of an expert's
views should be avoided. Since the objective of increased participation is to bring new points of view to the attention of agency
decisionmakers, funding decisions should not be used to constrain
the point of view proffered:
Any proposal that provides compensation for attorneys' fees
must try to establish reasonable limits for such expenditures and
must simultaneously try "to provide sufficient incentive to attract
competent counsel so that intervenors can present their most effecUnlike the FTC Act, the 1976 version of S. 270
tive case. . . .
did not include dollar limits on attorneys' fees; it simply called for
compensation for reasonable attorneys' fees at "prevailing
rates."' 38 The original version of S. 270 also used the prevailing
rate standard, but added a $75.00 per hour maximum. 139 In a
later version, the limit was reduced to $50.00 per hour. 14 0 This
132. See notes 78-82 supra and accompanying text.
133. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(e)(2) (1979).
134. S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin Hearings11, supra note 65, at
101.
135. T. BOASBERG, L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, at 171.
136. Id.
137. T. BOASBERO, L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, at 185.
138. S. 2715, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprintedin Hearings on S. 2715 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedureofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 137, 140 (1976).
139. S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin HearingsII, supra note 65, at
79. Attorneys' fees in excess of $75 per hour were available only if the agency determined
that special considerations warranted a higher fee. Id.
140. See id, reprintedin HearingsII, supra note 65, at 101. The bill did permit awards
in excess of $50 per hour based upon an agency finding that "special factors, such as an
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coincides with the limit established in the FTC regulations.' 4 '
This limit was also endorsed by several public interest attorneys
who testified at the hearings and viewed the fifty dollar figure as
"more than adequate to cover the salary of a lawyer and the overhead expenses associated with it."' 4 2
While retaining a maximum figure probably will not unduly
hinder the efforts of citizen groups to find competent counsel, 143 it

may help to defuse some of the arguments against public financing. Critics of S. 270 called the bill a "lawyers' bill' which would
only "enrich a class of lawyers [who] do little but milk the system."'" Others have commented that the bill was "yet another
way the public is required to support lawyers"1 45 or a "bonanza
for lawyers."' 4 6 Yet, the fact that such "bonanzas" would be cur-

tailed not only by the express statutory limit but by the require-

ment that such fees be "reasonable,"' 147 seems to blunt the force of

these critical concerns.
Such fee limits will not, however, eliminate a related con-

cern-that lawyers will control the public participation program.' 48 One commentator noted the "potential atrophy of
political consciousness and responsibility [that would arise] were
judges and lawyers to assume custody over issues properly resolved by political means." 149 This concern may derive from the
nature of the relationship that often exists between citizen groups

and their lawyers. After describing the Center for Law and Social
Policy, a major public interest law firm, a study concluded:
To some extent, then, the Center not only represents these
increase in the cost of living or limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved justify a higher fee." Id.
141. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(e)(2) (1979).
142. HearingsI, supra note 10, at 88 (statement of Anthony Z. Roisman).
143. Any program, however, must include a provision such as the S. 270 "special factors" section in order to permit agencies to adjust fees to account for inflation. See note
140 supra.
144. HearingsI, supra note 10, at 76 (statement of Senator James B. Allen).
145. Id. at 168 (statement of Curtis Clinkscales).
146. Id. at 265 (statement of the United States Industrial Council). There seemed to be
no end to such sentiments: the bill was also called a "raid on the Treasury of the United
States," id. at 167 (statement of Curtis Clinkscales), in order to establish a "slush fund for
activists and lawyers who frequently have little of the traditional restraint and discipline of
" Id. at 110 (statement of Ben Blackburn).
the real world ..
147. S. 270, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin HearingsII, supra note 65, at
101.
148. See generally Cahn & Calm, Power to the People or the Profession?-ThePublic
Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970).
149. Stewart, supra note 4, at 1803.
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groups, but in doing so tends to define their goals and, perhaps,
their structures and internal organizations as well, if only in the
discretion it exercises in choosing the types of cases it will take,
what strategies will be used, what remedies sought, what compromises accepted.1 50
This relationship reflects the current financing system. It is public
interest law firms, not citizen groups, which receive foundation
grants.'' In the present system, "the decision as to which 'public'
interest will enjoy representation before the agency rests primarily
foundations that provide the
with the private attorneys and the
' 52
representation."'
such
for
funding
Representation of a group need not necessarily translate into
control of a group. The safest course to ensure that representation
does not parlay into control is to enforce the eligibility requirements strictly for all applicants. In order to be eligible for funds
under a funding program similar to S. 270, an organization should
be an "effective representative" of an interest. The group should
have to show that it has a constituency to which it is accountable.
If it appears that the group is controlled by its lawyers or is merely
a front for the lawyers, rather than being controlled by the interest
it purports to represent, then an agency should deny its application for funding. Notably by providing funds to citizen groups,
rather than to lawyer groups, S. 270 was an improvement over the
existing system for financing public participation in administrative
proceedings which consists largely of foundation grants to lawyer
groups.
D.

Advance Payments

Like the FTC regulations, 53 S. 270 provided for advance payments if the applicant "establishes that [its] ability. . . to participate in the proceeding will be impaired by failure to receive funds
prior to the conclusion of such proceeding."' 154 This was a crucial
section since participation would be impossible for many local
groups if they were forced to wait until the end of the proceeding
for any reimbursement.' 5 5 Without the availability of advance
150. Comment, supra note 18, at 733.
151. Stewart, supra note 4, at 1764.
152. Id.
153. 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(e) (1979). See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
154. S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin HearingsII, supra note 65, at
101. The section also provides for repayment of funds advanced if the applicant fails to
participate as promised. Id. at 102-03. FTC Chairman Collier testified that the latter provision was too restrictive. HearingsI, supra note 10, at 22 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
155. Hearings I, supra note 10, at 254-55 (statement of Terrence Roche Murphy); R.
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payments, or at least a progressive payment" system, a federal
funding program would likely only be able to assist large national
organizations.156 One person, who is experienced with the FTC
program, has suggested that agencies should routinely advance
fifty percent of the award at the time the application is approved,
pay another twenty-five percent as needed during the proceeding,
percent after a final accounting
and then pay the final twenty-five
57
at the end of the proceeding.'

Under S. 270, unless a participant could qualify for advance
payments, it would have to wait for compensation until the pro58
ceeding, or perhaps a phase of the proceeding, was completed.'
Yet, to construe a phase of the proceeding in a manner to provide
for periodic reimbursements would be a strained interpretation,
since it is not only logically unappealing but also inconsistent with
the definition used by agencies for other purposes.' 5 9 Consequently, in future proposals, Congress should expressly provide
for periodic reimbursements in all cases, as well as advances
where appropriate. In addition, once an application has been approved, there appears to be no valid reason to withhold the funds
until the end of the proceeding since once an applicant has qualified, it need only prove that it had incurred expenditures. Therefore, periodic reimbursements should not be considered
"advances."
E. Type of ProceedingsIncluded
One of the most significant differences between the FTC program and S. 270 was that the latter encompassed almost all agency
proceedings. It covered "all rulemaking, ratemaking, and licensing proceedings, and . . . other proceedings involving issues
which relate directly to health, safety, civil rights, the environFRANK, J. ONeK & J. STEINBERG, supra note 13, at 113, reprinted in Hearings I, supra note
10, at 673.
156. T. BOASBERO, L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KAss, supra note 22, at 174-77. The
Second Circuit has recognized the importance of interim reimbursements to intervenors:
[I]t is clear to us that a refusal to award petitioners expenses as they are incurred,
particularly expenses related to production of expert witnesses, may significantly
hamper a petitioner's efforts to represent the public interest before the Commission. And, a retroactive award of experts' fees would be small consolation to a
petitioner if the hearings are finished, the record is complete, and these experts
were not called because of inadequate funds.
Green Cty. Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 426 (2d Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted).
157. Hearings 1,supra note 10, at 232 (letter from Robert B. Choate).
158. S.270, 95th Cong., IstSess. § 2 (1977), reprinted in Hearings If, supra note 65, at
100-01.
159. See, e.g., notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
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ment, or60 the economic well-being of consumers in the market-

place." 1

The goal of a federal program to compensate participants in

agency proceedings is to ensure that a broad spectrum of ideas
will be heard and considered in agency decisionmaking

processes.1 6' That goal is clearly advanced by funding participa162
tion in rulemakings which are patently legislative proceedings.
The administrative process, however, does not fall neatly into categories. Policy is frequently made in enforcement or adjudicatory
proceedings. For example, adjudicatory proceedings are used by
the CAB for allocating routes. The focus of this type of proceeding, however, is quite general and has wide impact on the public.

Recognizing that public participation is desirable in such proceedings, the CAB has developed "relatively refined rules regarding
intervention which attempt to adjust the degree of permitted participation to the intensity of the applicant's interest and the applicant's ability to contribute information relevant to specific issues
or the overall decision to be made." 163 The desirability of encourthat compensation
aging intervention in such cases suggests
164
should not be limited to rulemaking.
Intervention is particularly important in cases where the
agency staff and the license applicant have already worked out
their differences before the hearing. 65 For example, the AEC
160. S.270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin Hearings1I, supra note 65, at
97-98. "Proceeding" was defined as "any agency process including rulemaking, ratemaking, licensing, adjudication, or any other agency process in which there may be public
participation pursuant to statute, regulation, or agency practice, whether or not such process is subject to the provisions of this subchapter." Id. at 97. Some have suggested that an
even broader concept is appropriate:
I think the role of citizen groups should neither be confined to adjudication
and rulemaking nor be confined to "hearings" and "proceedings." The vital interests of such groups extend to all kinds of administrative action (or inaction),
including determinations of whether or not to investigate, to initiate, to prosecute,
to contract, to advise, to threaten, to conceal, to publicize, and to supervise.
T. BOASBERG, L. HEWES,N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, app. F at 6 (statement of
Kenneth Culp Davis).
161. See notes 1-39 supra and accompanying text.
162. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
163. Comment, supra note 18, at 740.
164. License renewal proceedings before the FCC also involve policy issues which peculiarly invite citizen intervention. The court in Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.D.C. 1966), recognized that such proceedings
enabled local groups to make a valuable contribution by monitoring the broadcast facility
and providing factual information that the FCC has neither the staff nor the money to
gather. Id. at 1004. See also Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 377.
165. See generally Green, Safety Determinationsin Nuclear Power Licensing: .4Critical
View, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 633 (1968).
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viewed the primary purpose of licensing hearings as the opportunity "to convince the public that the AEC staff has diligently reviewed an application and to demonstrate that [the license] is
' 66
decidedly in the public interest."'
The decision whether to encourage participation in a given
proceeding cannot be made on the basis of the name attached to
it. Functional criteria should be devised, focusing on the nature of
the issues presented and the potential impact of the decision. To
the extent that intervention delays enforcement or subjects a respondent to more than one adversary, intervention must be limited; but to the extent that such proceedings are used to formulate
67
policy, intervention should be encouraged.1
Restricting the bill to rulemaking proceedings, as suggested by
some opponents of the bill, 68 would simply reinforce the propensity of certain agencies to employ ad hoc adjudicatory processes
for establishing policy. Such choices should not be encouraged
since reliance on adjudication tends to "foreclose consideration of
unargued alternatives or attention to unrepresented interests,
169
[and] inhibits the independent formation of general policies."'
Moreover, "making decisions case-by-case on the basis of a
lengthy evidentiary record may favor the regulated interest at the
expense of the 'public' interest because it throws the decision into
the forum in which the industry groups are best equipped to comt7 0
pete."'
Admittedly, a federal compensation program such as S. 270
will not improve public participation in the unknown number of
government decisions that are made in informal meetings.' 7' Although some informal contacts are probably "necessary, useful,
and inevitable," 7 2 the "practice of putting 'all the action' into secret consultations"'' 73 provides an undesirable opportunity for im166. Comment, supra note 18, at 831.
167. Id. at 799.
168. See, e.g., HearingsI supra note 10, at 114 (statement of William H. Cuddy); id. at
134-35 (statement of George Gleason).
169. Comment, supra note 18, at 723.
170. Cramton, supra note 3, at 536. See also Galanter, supra note 9.
171. "My own guess is that perhaps 90 per cent [sic] of the Government's work is conducted outside the boundaries of the Administrative Procedure Act." Gardner, The Procedures by Which Informal.4ction Is Taken, 24 AD. L. REv. 155, 156 (1972).
172. R. FRANK, J. ONEK & J. STEINBERG, supra note 13, at 78, reprintedin HearingsI,
supra note 10, at 555, 638.
173. Schotland, supra note 34, at 267.
The Administrative Conference of the United States formed a committee to study the
extent and effects of informal agency action. For a report of the beginning work of that
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proper influence and thus seriously undermines confidence in the
system. According to one observer, "the content of rulemaking
decisions is often largely determined in advance through a process

of informal consultation in which organized interests may enjoy a
preponderant influence." 174 However, a genuine tension exists between the need to defer to agency decisions concerning their own
priorities regarding the amount of resources to devote to formal
proceedings and the need for openness and greater participation

in important decisions. Thus, any proposal in this area must consider these concerns.
F. Compensationfor JudicialReview
Two other important departures from the FTC scheme were
the provisions in S. 270 for review of the compensation decision 7 5
and for compensation for judicial review of agency decisions gen-

erally. 176 Review of award decisions can be critical to the viability
of a compensation program in an agency unsympathetic to the
concept of broadened participation. The possibility of review

could prevent unfair denial of funding and provide
such an
77
agency with an incentive to make careful decisions. 1
While the FTC Act is ambiguous on whether compensation
may be granted for expenses incurred in obtaining judicial review
of agency decisions, FTC guidelines clearly preclude such compensation.' 78 Nonetheless, compensation for successful or meritorious judicial review of agency decisions seems wholly justified.

As one witness noted, "[P]ublic interest groups that succeed in ridding the books of an invalid, unauthorized, or unconstitutional
79
regulation or act, should be compensated for that contribution." 1
committee, see Lockhart, The Origin and Use of "Guidelinesfor the Study oflnformalAction
inFederalAgencies", 24 AD.L. REv. 167 (1972).
174. Stewart, supra note 4,at 1775.
175. S.270, 95th Cong., IstSess. § 2 (1977), reprinted in Hearings II, supra note 65, at
103-04.
176. S.270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1977), reprinted in Hearings II, supra note 65, at
106.
177. William Foley, Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
expressed concern that the criteria established for compensation involved "considerations
of policy" and so "are highly inappropriate for judicial review." Hearings I, supra note 10,
at 184 (statement of William E. Foley). Yet, this argument is unconvincing when one notes
that courts are engaged daily in making decisions involving policy issues. In addition, the
review of award decisions will not be any more difficult than decisions courts are already
making under the many statutes that permit fee-shifting.
178. See text following note 72 supra.
179. Hearings I,supra note 10, at 54 (statement of William J. Scott).
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G.

Control Within Each Agency

The most troubling aspect of S. 270 was that it left administration of the compensation program to each individual agency. This
apparently reflected an opinion that only the agency or hearing
officer could adequately evaluate the contributions of the participants.' 80 The weakness in this rationale is that award decisions
are usually made before the proceeding, so the analogy to a judge
awarding costs at the end of a trial is inapt. Furthermore, agency
control of public participation funding programs could seriously
impair such programs in agencies that are unsympathetic to public
participation-the very agencies where the need for more participation is most acute.
It is certainly true that the agency staff is more familiar with its
own procedures than any outside group. The agency staff's proximity to the issues and the resultant ability to detect possible benefits of participation more easily than an outside group also argues
for agency control. The agency must also have discretion to control its own proceedings. It must determine the scope of the proceedings and what kinds of intervention and participation are
appropriate. Once the scope of a proceeding is established, however, it seems entirely reasonable to expect that an outside group
or agency could evaluate the potential contributions of applicants.'8
One problem in a compensation system controlled within each
agency is that the decision whether to fund a particular applicant
will necessarily require an assessment of the merits of the positions of the applicant.' 82 One commentator noted, "There is reason to fear that a fair, objective, and nonideological determination
of requests would be difficult."' 83 The possibility for favoritism
towards certain interests may undermine confidence in the program. A witness representing the United States Industrial Council
at the S. 270 hearings complained that the bill would be "opening
180. See T. BOASBERG, L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, at 201-02.
181. In fact, an outside group may be better able to judge whether a group has a unique
point of view or represents an interest not otherwise represented. It would be quite tempting for an agency-within the agency control model--to decide that its own staf can represent a particular interest even if the eligibility standards specified that that was not a proper
factor to consider. See S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, reprintedin HearingsII, supra note

65, at 98.
182. For a discussion of other problems, see text accompanying notes 94-101 supra.
183. Cramton, supra note 3, at 544.
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the way for 'stacked' hearings."' 8 4 Another witness, who was ex-

tremely critical of the FTC program, testified that a government
compensation program would enable agency staffs to finance
"witch hunts" against businesses by paying "enough
moneyseekers to heavily outweigh the honest and185valid arguments
of those directly affected by the agency action."
To the opposite effect, there can be no doubt that some persons
see agency control of program guidelines as a means of keeping
certain unwanted groups out of the proceedings." 6 FTC experience has borne out the prediction that agency award decisions will
be viewed with suspicion." 7 FTC Chairman Collier strongly rec-

ommended that the S.270 program be administered by a single
agency to avoid the appearance of bias.'
Another factor favoring centralized administration is the need
for uniform application procedures and guidelines. 8 9 Even if fu-

ture proposals are more specific than S. 270, it is likely that many
operating details would be determined by agency guidelines. The

existence of varying procedures and conflicting requirements may
be a serious disadvantage to small, local organizations which
might not have the wherewithal to cope with diverse demands. 9 o

In addition, administration by one agency would greatly facilitate
congressional oversight of the entire program. 19 1

Central administration of the program may not require the
creation of a new agency. Several existing agencies have been
suggested: the Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the General Services Administration (GSA). 192 Of course, the program
184. Hearings ,supra note 10, at 265 (statement of the United States Industrial Council).
185. Id. at 168 (statement of Curtis Clinkscales).
186. Id. at 137 (statement of George Gleason).
187. Id. at 6-7 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
188. See id. at 10-17 (statement of Calvin J. Collier). S.270 required that compensation decisions be made by a division within the agency other than the one responsible for
the proceeding. S.270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin Hearings!, supra note
65, at 102.
189. HearingsI, supra note 10, (statement of William T. Coleman, Jr.). See also note
120 supra.
190. See Hearings I, supra note 10, at 256 (statement of Terrence Roche Murphy).
191. Id. at 6 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
192. Id. at 21 (statement of Calvin J. Collier); id. at 101 (statement of William T. Coleman, Jr.). The Justice Department may not be the best choice of centralized control suggested. Since it represents the government in cases of judicial review of agency decisions,
potential conflicts of interest may arise which are similar to the conflicts present where the
funding program is run by the individual agencies.
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need not be administered by an agency at all; it may be preferable
93
to establish a semi-public corporation for that purpose.
Whatever mechanism is used, there is a need to find an outside
group "that could make an objective judgment of the utility of the
intervention." ' 94 If central administration of the program is to be
achieved it is essential that it be built into any future program
from the beginning. It is simply inconceivable that such a change
could be effected once each agency has established its own program and guidelines.
H. PrioritiesAmong Groups
Another shortcoming of S. 270 was its failure to provide sufficient guidance for choosing among those applicants competing for
funds. Three kinds of allocations would be required under such a
program. The entire sum of money appropriated would initially
be allocated among the agencies. Each agency's share would then
be allocated among proceedings and, finally, divided among applicants. S. 270 placed the responsibility for allocation among
agencies upon the OMBI 5 but was silent about allocation among
proceedings. Future proposals should address this issue. The easiest solution would probably be to make compensation available
for any proceeding in which intervention is permitted, with the
amount of money available dependent upon the importance of the
issues and the number of intervenors.
The bill did offer a list of alternatives for handling multiple
applications, 196 but this constituted little more than an express recognition that agencies would have substantial discretion in this
area. 9 7 Establishing priorities among competing applicants was
left to each agency. The drafters of S. 270 may have decided that
because of the general lack of experience within the agencies in
establishing such priorities, it would be preferable to allow agencies to experiment with various criteria. Agencies have not traditionally had to make such decisions. Restrictive standing
requirements and the high costs of participation 98 created such
193. See Bonfield, supra note 117, at 540.
194. Cramton, supra note 3, at 545.
195. See S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin HearingsII, supranote 65,

at 104-05.
196. Id. § 2, reprinted in Hearings II, supra note 65, at 100.
197. One alternative, for example, was for the agency to "select one or more effective

representatives to participate." Id.
198. See note 16 supra. Costs have been expressly recognized as barriers to "too
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barriers to broad participation that the "problem" of choosing
among intervenors rarely, if ever, arose.
One study suggested that the following factors should be considered:
-- the group's experience and expertise in the substantive area;
-the group's experience with the procedures and approach of
the agency;
-the extent to which the group has a constituency and the degree to which the group is accountable for its activities to its
constituency;
-- the general competence of the group as evidenced by its prior
activities; and
-the specificity
of its proposed involvement in the agency's
99
work.
Although it seems essential that the agency scrutinize the activities
of the applicants "to ensure that theirs is a valid commitment to
the issues, ' ' ° too much attention to that criterion could adversely
affect the ability of new local groups to participate. 0 Furthermore, agencies may exhibit a natural bias in favor of moderate
groups, which may impede the development of new organizations
with truly innovative ideas. The CAB, recognizing the dilemma
inherent in considering how much weight to give past experience
or prior participation, has acknowledged an uncertainty about
whether it should encourage the development of "a full-time 'public bar' by repetitive grants to representatives who have developed
expertise through prior activities .. ."2o2
Related to the past participation criterion is the issue of
whether agencies (or Congress) should establish a ceiling on the
amount of compensation that a single organization may receive in
much" intervention. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where the court noted:
The fears of regulatory agencies that their processes will be inundated by expansion of standing criteria are rarely borne out. Always a restraining factor is the
expense of participation in the administrative process, an economic reality which
will operate to limit the number of those who will seek participation....
Id. at 1006.
199. R. FRANK, J. ONEK & J. STEINBERG, supra note 13, reprintedinHearingsI, supra
note 10, at 555, 673. In the proposed DOT program, priorities were to be judged by the
"applicant's interest, proposals, and past performance in regulatory proceedings." 42 Fed.
Reg. 2865 (1977).
200. Hearings , supra note 10, at 231 (letter from Robert B. Choate).
201. T. BOASBERG, L. HEwEs, N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, at 75.
202. CAB, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 42 Fed. Reg. 8663 (1977), reprinted in HearingsI, supra note 10, at 472, 481.
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any year.2 0 3 Such limits could serve the dual purpose of compelling organizations to establish priorities among proceedings in
which they wish to intervene and of inhibiting agency favoritism.2" On the other hand, until there is evidence that an agency
is misusing funds, it seems difficult to justify establishing artificial
barriers to participation because of an applicant's past success.
Moreover, given the ease with which organizations can be formed
around a given issue or project, it is questionable whether spending ceilings would be an effective solution to the problem of experienced groups acquiring the lion's share of agency funds even if a
problem were shown to exist.2" 5 Notably, the FTC imposes2 0 6no
ceilings and, based on its experience, sees no need for them.
I. The S. 270 Critics
As demonstrated by those who participated in the hearings on
S. 270, the concept of federal financing for public participation in
agency proceedings has widespread support. Federal agency officials, state officials, representatives of private industry, public interest lawyers, and grassroots citizen groups all voiced their
support. Still, critics exist. Some opponents seem simply to misunderstand the purpose of the program. One witness at the hearings, for example, stated that the "fundamental fallacy" of the bill
was that "no agency can determine . . . which participant best
represents the interests of the general public. ' 20 7 Yet, no one

would argue that an agency could or should try to identify a single
representative of the public interest. Rather, the objective of a
program of public funding is to broaden the number of views
presented. By promoting "an awareness of the complexities of an
issue and its potential impact," a decision can be made that is in
the public interest.20
203. See T. BOASBERG, L. HEWEs, N. KLORES & B. KAss, supra note 22, at 187; Hearings I, supra note 10, at 146 (statement of George Gleason).
204. Note, supra note 13, at 1833.
205. The CAB has recognized that the strict financial need standard established by the
Comptroller General, see text accompanying note - infra, creates difficulties that are
"multiplied by the ease with which new organizations can be formed, tailored to meet
whatever test of indigency is necessary." CAB, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
42 Fed. Reg. 8663 (1977), reprinted in Hearings I, supra note 10, at 472, 481.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission's proposed rule for a compensation program specifies that groups organized "solely to participate in Commission proceedings are
included .. " 42 Fed. Reg. 15,712 (1977).
206. Hearings I, supra note 10, at 42 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
207. Id. at 274 (statement of the National Association of Motor Bus Owners).
208. Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 381.
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Other critics remain unconvinced that increased participation
is necessary. They assert that "the duty of representing the public
in the Government is the duty of the Congressmen and Senators"20 9 or that "the various and often competing interests of the
numerous constituencies are presented effectively by governmental agencies with different primary goals. . . . [Thus,] private litigants are not needed to force Government to act in the public
interest."2 10 However, the fact that the agencies cannot adquately
represent the public interest has been widely recognized for more
than a decade.2 t It is remarkable that in 1977 the FPC Chairman
would oppose S. 270 on the basis that the agency "is obligated by
existing law to represent the overall public interest itself, and it
does infactfufil that obligation without the necessity for new legislation. ' 21 2 Such an attitude simply reinforces the need for legislation similar to that proposed in S. 270.
The most strident opposition to the Public Participation Act
came from those who were alarmed by increased participation.
These parties predicted that such a program would "cause great
disruption in agency licensing, rulemaking, and ratemaking proceedings,"2 '3 open a pandora's box of "adventurism by those
whose ends are publicity and self-service,"2" 4 and "subsidize agitation by interest groups. 21 5
Others opposed to S. 270 cited delay as their basic concern.
These parties reasoned that since high costs--once a "natural"
209. HearingsI, supra note 10, at 103 (statement of Ben Blackburn).
210. Id. at 124 (statement of David B. Graham). Similar arguments have been made
elsewhere:
Since the public is already paying the costs of NRC regulators, the argument
continues,. . . why should the public also be forced to subsidize others to do the
same job . . . ? Further, once we pay for guardians to watch the guardians-where will it all end? Better, . . . if we are displeased with the manner in
which NRC operates to change the nature of its regulatory scheme or its personnel, rather than to construct another pretentious layer of dubious value.
T. BOASBERG, L. HEWES, N. KLORES & B. KAss, supra note 22, at 121.
211. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
212. HearingsI, supra note 10 at 188 (letter from Richard L. Dunham) (emphasis added). "No agency, however conscientious, has a monopoly of wisdom. The wisest agencies
are those that encourage others to inform them and do not pretend to speak for the public
interest with the only qualified voice." T. BOASBERG, L. HEwEs, N. KLORES & B. KAss,
supra note 22, app. F at 7 (statement of Malcolm S. Mason). See also note 2 supra and
accompanying text.
213. Hearings I, supra note 10, at 74 (statement of Senator James B. Allen).
214. Id. at 167 (statement of Curtis Clinkscales).
215. Id. at 266 (statement of the United States Industrial Council).
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barrier to excessive intervention 2'-were removed by providing
compensation, the agencies would be overrun by intervenors, re-

sulting in interminable, costly delays.217 Although this argument
has some logical appeal, it is not necessarily accurate. First, the
availability of compensation would allow citizen groups to find
competent technical experts and counsel to assist them in focusing
on the issues. Some observers believe that that would expedite,

not delay, administrative proceedings. 218 For example, several of
the intervenor groups in the NRC Seabrook hearings said that

"the availability of NRC financial assistance would serve to consolidate rather than expand their presentations. 21 9 Furthermore,
in some cases, improved public participation may actually save
money and time, "for the presence of representative groups may
save the agency from serious substantive error and from serious
delay. '"22 o
Moreover, the delay argument rests to some extent on the assumption that the proceedings would get "out of control" because

of increased intervention. However, a public financing program
would neither create new rights of intervention 22' nor alter the
intervention rules and procedures created by agency guidelines.22 2

By proper application of their own rules, the agencies themselves
can "assure that the risks of delay or deflection of the hearings
from their proper focus are insubstantial. ' 22 3 Furthermore, even

with liberal rules of intervention, agencies have wide discretion to
216. See note 198 supra and accompanying text.
217. HearingsI, supra note 10, at 191 (statement of Richard L. Dunham).
218. Id. at 82 (statement of Anthony Z. Roisman).
219. T. BOASBERG, L. HEwas, N. KLORES & B. KASS, supra note 22, at 194 n.389.

220. Id., app. F at 7 (statement of Malcolm S.Mason).
221. See S. 270, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess. § 2 (1977), reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 65,
at 98.
222. For some intervention rules, see note 16 supra. As an example of the control that
an agency can exercise over its proceedings, the FERC (formerly the FPC) rule contains
the following provision:
Where there are two or more interveners having substantially like interests and
positions, the Commission or presiding officer may, in order to expedite the hearing, arrange appropriate limitations on the number of attorneys who will be permitted to cross-examine and make and argue motions and objections on behalf of
such interveners.
18 C.F.R. § 1.8(g) (1978).
In addition, agencies often have broad discretion to decide whether to hold a public
hearing at all. Such authority was granted to the FCC in 1955 to enable the Commission
"to curb the abuses of the protest procedure through the power in appropriate cases, to
dispose of protests without holding a full evidentiary hearing." S.REP. No. 1231, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1955).
223. Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 384.
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structure their proceedings and limit the scope of participation.2 24
Not all intervenors need be accorded full party status; participation can be tailored to the particular contribution involved. It is
not uncommon for participation to be limited to the submission of
an amicus brief, an appearance as a witness, or the presentation of
evidence on one of several issues.2 25
Some delays should not legitimately be charged solely to intervention. For example, power plant sitings now take longer because of the time required to consider the environmental impact.
Such delay is not the arbitrary result of environmentalists bringing suit for any whimsical purpose-rather, they seek to force
agency compliance with the law.22 6 Delay for such purposes has
been characterized as "essential to successful performance of the
agency's mandate. ' 227 Finally, it should be noted that participation under a compensation program similar to S. 270 would depend upon a finding that the applicant will make a substantial
contribution to the proceeding; if an intervenor meets this critewould be well-used
rion, then the time required for participation
22 8
and should not be disparaged as "delay.Other critics focused not on the issue of intervention, but on
the concept of providing federal funds. To these critics, S. 270
represented "a blank check on the Federal Treasury to subsidize
existing organizations which fear that they cannot justify continued existence in the marketplace of the general public. '229 The
rationale was simple: if an interest is worth being heard, its proponents will be able to raise adequate funds to represent that interest; if member support and nongovernment sources are not
that the organization's posisufficient, "it is reasonable to assume
230
tions are not broadly supported.
Financial support, however, does not always gravitate toward
224. Cramton, supra note 3, at 537. See, e.g., FTC, REIMBURSEMENT, supra note 50, at
9, reprintedin Hearings I, supra note 10, at 409.
225. See Gellhom, supra note 12, at 386; Shapiro, supra note 16, at 755.
226. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965).
227. Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 383. Of course, delay is often used as a tactic, but such
use is not confined to any single group or interest, "public" or "private." As one witness at
the S. 270 hearings noted: "often times [sic] it is the regulated industry, through its
financial ability that may lengthen proceedings and pursue numerous appeals while the
evil sought to be cured continues." Hearings4 supra note 10, at 54 (statement of William
J. Scott).
228. See HearingsI, supra note 10, at 69 (statement of Stanley C. Van Ness).
229. Id. at 104 (statement of Ben Blackburn).
230. Id. at 179 (statement of Frederick T. Poole).
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worthy causes or programs. The public interest law movement in
general and a federal compensation program in particular are attempts to remedy the effects of scarce resources and to reduce hostility toward those who have not previously had a voice in agency
decisionmaking due to lack of funds.
Furthermore, it simply is not accurate to claim that "credible
intervenor groups have adequate opportunities for funds. ' 231 It is
common knowledge among public interest lawyers that the foundations, which provide essential seed money enabling many
groups to begin operations, cannot be expected to continue such
subsidies indefinitely. 232 The obverse of this argument is a concern that public funding may have adverse effects on public interest groups-that they may become too concerned about being
"fundable" or may themselves fall prey to a sort of reverse capture
phenomenon wherein the public interest groups fall under the
control of the agencies.233 Consequently, the eligibility criteria
should provide a check against such effects within the groups. If
an organization becomes interested only in being funded, it is
likely to lose its constituents, and no longer qualify as an effective
representative.
J.

The Searchfor Alternatives

Other suggestions for securing public representation in agency
proceedings-such as establishing an office of public counsel
within each agency or simply permitting agencies to establish their
own programs for compensating public intervenors-are unsatisfactory alternatives to the approach of S. 270. Offices of public
counsel have occasionally been used in federal agencies to provide
a voice for the consumer or generally to represent the public.234
This alternative has two fundamental weaknesses. First, it seems
inevitable that an "in-house" public representative will often disagree with the agency position, thus jeopardizing either its own
funding (and existence) or its independence. 235 The history of
231. Id. at 125 (statement of David B. Graham).
232. See T. BOASBERO, L. HEwEs, N. KLORES & B. KAss, supra note 22, at 163; Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 389; Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 13, at 1112; Lenny, supra
note 6, at 485; Schotland, supra note 34, at 272.
233. See HearingsI, supra note 10, at 270 (letter from Pacific Legal Foundation); id. at
283 (letter from the Air Transport Association); Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 13, at
1112.
234. See Bloch & Stein, supra note 11.
235. T. BOASBERG, L. HEWes, N. KLORES & B. KAss, supra note 22, at 153; Cramton,
supra note 3, at 546. See generally Lazarus & Onek, supra note 11.
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such offices bears out this prediction. Except in a few cases, these
offices have been ineffective in the administrative process. One
commentator has noted that "almost all of the consumer's counsel
offices organized as separate entities within
the federal establish2' 36
ment have atrophied and disappeared.
Second, a single representative for the public interest is insufficient. Indeed, the effort to increase public participation in the administrative process is a response to the failure of the notion that
the agencies alone can represent the public interest. Although
new offices may function vigorously at first, "the same forces
which have led to agency favoritism toward organized interests
could in time produce a similar bias on the part of advocacy agencies."2 37 Individuals with experience in state public advocacy
agencies echoed these sentiments at the S. 270 hearings. Citing
examples of conflicts among the interests they are expected to represent, one witness, who strongly endorsed S. 270, concluded that
it is "impossible for one governmental agency to represent all consumer interests. 2 38
Not only is the concept of in-house public representatives an
inadequate alternative, it may even be counterproductive to the
objectives of a compensation program. Agencies unsympathetic
to public intervention could use the presence of such an office as
an excuse to deny any alternative intervention to that of the inhouse public counsel. Thus, there is a risk that public participation could actually be reduced if this alternative were accepted.2 39
A second alternative is to permit each agency to establish its
own compensation program. There has been a recent trend in this
direction.2 40 In a few bills introduced since the 1975 FTC amendments, Congress has expressly provided for such funding pro236. Bonfield, supra note 117, at 538.
237. Stewart, supra note 4, at 1770.
238. HearingsI supra note 10, at 63 (statement of Arthur Penn). One example of the
difficulty of such public representatives in effectively representing diverse interests occurred
with the New Jersey Office of Public Advocate. For a case of utility rate increases the
Office not only represented the broad interest of obtaining service at the lowest possible
cost, but also represented Senior Citizens who wanted special rates, which in turn would
cause higher rates for other consumers. Id.
239. See Comment, supra note 18, at 751.
240. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1977), reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 463 (advance notice of proposed rulemaking by the Environmental Protection Agency); id. at 2864
(final rule and advance notice of proposed rulemaking by National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration); id. at 8663 reprintedin Hearings1,supranote 10, at 472 (advance notice of
proposed rulemaking by CAB); id. at 15,711 (proposed policies and procedures by CPSC).
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grams.24 Most of the programs, however, rely on the inherent
power of the agency to cover expenses necessary for carrying out
its function. This concept originated in a 1976 decision of the
Comptroller General in response to an NRC inquiry concerning
the propriety of having its own compensation program. The
Comptroller General concluded that
if NRC in the exercise of its administrative discretion, determines that it cannot make the required determination unless it
extends financial assistance to certain interested parties who require it, and whose participation is essential to dispose of the
matter before it, we would not object to use of its appropriated
funds for this purpose.2 42
In a subsequent letter the Comptroller General indicated that the
NRC decision also applied to nine other agencies-FCC, FTC,
FPC, ICC, the Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC),
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the FDA, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)-and "to agencies
other than the ones mentioned . . . assuming that there was no
243
specific legislative prohibition against it."
While the NRC decision is encouraging, programs established
under the Comptroller General's interpretation are an inadequate
alternative to a comprehensive federal program. Because there
may be statutes which prohibit an agency from developing a funding program, not all agencies may have inherent authority to establish participation compensation programs. In addition, even
those programs which could be established through the inherent
authority of an agency may be limited in scope. According to the
Comptroller General, no payments may be made to a representative who is not indigent, under programs established by an
agency's inherent authority. 2' Thus, in one case, the Comptroller
General struck down an FDA program which had adopted liberal
interest and indigency standards, 245 similar to those developed by
241. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, § 21(b)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 2620(b)(4)(C)

(1976).
242. Decision of the Comptroller General, Costs of Intervention-Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Feb. 19, 1976, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 418, 421.
243. Id. at 431 (letter from the Deputy Comptroller General to Hon. John E. Moss,
May 10, 1976). At least one agency has announced a program based on the "other agency"
clause. See 42 Fed. Reg. 8663 (1977), reprintedin Hearings., supra note 10, at 472 (advance notice of proposed rulemaking by-CAB).
244. Decision of the Comptroller General, Costs of Intervention-Food and Drug Administration, Dec. 3, 1976, reprintedin HearingsI, supra note 10, at 455, 460.
245. Id. For FDA program standards, see 41 Fed. Reg. 35,855 app. A, at 35,860 (1976).
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the FTC2 46 and proposed by S. 270.247 The Comptroller General
found that advance payments were also prohibited in such programs.2 48
As previously noted, both the broader standard of financial eligibility adopted by the FTC249 and proposed in S. 270250 and the
ability to tender advance payments 25 ' are essential to ensure the
success of a government-wide program.
Another weakness in relying on the inherent power of an
agency to create a federal funding program is that the decision to
establish the program is left entirely to each agency's individual
discretion. Ironically, the NRC-the agency whose inquiry initiated the Comptroller General's opinion-has decided not to establish a compensation program. The Commission announced
that since such a program involved using public money to finance
what it regarded as a "private viewpoint," the NRC should not act
without express authorization from Congress. 25 2 Referring to the
Comptroller General's decision,2 53 the Commission concluded,
"we certainly cannot say that we 'cannot make' the safety, safeguards, environmental or antitrust findings required of us by relevant statutes unless we fund these parties . . .". The FCC has
also declined to initiate a funding program, claiming that the "primary problem for the FCC is our uncertainty as to whether Congress will support such a reimbursement program, and [our belief
that]. . . it would be imprudent to proceed further without specifically earmarked funds for such purposes. 2 5 5
To argue that Congress should leave the issue to the agencies,
while some agencies refuse to act in the absence of express Congressional authority, produces an absurd circularity. Even if all
agencies were able and willing to establish compensation programs, a program such as that proposed by S. 270 would still be
the preferable alternative. The Comptroller General, while acknowledging the authority of individual agencies to establish
246. See notes 57-65 supra and accompanying text.
247. See notes 124-26 supra and accompanying text.
248. See note 244 supra.
249. See notes 57-65 supra and acompanying text.
250. See notes 124-26 supra and accompanying text.
251. See notes 83-86, 153-59 supra and accompanying text.
252. Release from NRC Office of Public Affairs, No. 76-251, Nov. 12, 1976, reprintedin
Hearings , supra note 10, at 450.
253. See note 242 supra.
254. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 451.
255. 123 Cong. Rec. 6969 (1977).
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funding programs, stressed the desirability of Congressional action in order to provide some uniformity among the programs. 6
Even S. 270, which left administration of the program to each
agency, would have at least provided a uniform framework andconsistent eligibility criteria. Most importantly, a program like S.
270 would provide the express Congressional authority and direction sought by reluctant agencies and essential to a democratic
system.
III.

CONCLUSION

The necessity for a better balance among interests represented
in the administrative process is widely felt and recognized. It is
now clear that costs are the primary remaining obstacle to increased public participation. Expecting the government to help
eliminate this obstacle is appropriate; the proper functioning of
the federal administrative process is at stake, and it is "too important and urgent. . . to entrust its support to the uncertainties of
private fund raising. ' 25 7 The FTC program demonstrates that
federal financing can be an effective method of increasing the
number and diversity of interests represented in agency proceedings.
By extending to all proceedings of all federal agencies a program similar to that of the FTC, Congress can provide the means
for a truly democratic agency decisionmaking process. A compensation program modeled after S. 270, but with centralized administration and with greater specificity accorded to details of
implementation, would provide a significant boost to public participation in agency proceedings. The price for increasing that
participation may seem high, but the price of public noninvolvement is "intransigence of agency prejudice, resistance to enforcement, and further lack of confidence or credibility in
Government. 25 8

256. Decision of the Comptroller General, Costs of Intervention-Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Feb. 19, 1976, reprintedinHearingsI, supra note 10, at 418, 425. "The lack of
consistency which exists among those agencies actively encouraging paid public participation fosters increased public frustration and alienation." Id. at 207 (statement of the National Consumers League). For a comparison of the procedures used by three agencies, see
id. app. A, at 211-28.
257. Bonfield, supra note 117, at 543.
258. HearingsI, supra note 10, at 54 (statement of William J. Scott).

